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INTRODUCTION 
Chris Sagers’s new book, Apple, Antitrust, and Irony, focusing on 
the eBooks price-fixing conspiracy that led the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) to sue Apple in 2012, tackles an interesting conundrum. On 
one hand, the government’s case against Apple was strong and clear. 
Supported by undisputable written evidence, the government claimed 
and eventually proved that Apple initiated and coordinated a plan that 
required all major book publishers to license their eBooks to Amazon 
 
 
 
 
* Associate Professor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. I would like to 
thank Margot Kaminski for valuable comments on this essay. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
 
368 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 14:2 
 
 
for a higher price. Price fixing among competitors, i.e., the publishers, 
is per se illegal.1  
On the other hand, many commentators, mostly non-lawyers, did 
not condemn Apple. On the contrary, many perceived Apple as a force 
for good, while Amazon, the main target of the conspiracy and the 
company that encouraged the Department of Justice to investigate 
and sue, was seen as the real source of danger. For these 
commentators, this is a story in which the villain—with the assistance 
of the federal government no less—beats the hero. It is a story of 
injustice with possibly dire consequences. 
To explore this dichotomy, Sagers takes his readers on a 
fascinating journey through the history of the book industry; the 
emergence, expansion, and contraction of antitrust law and with it the 
public perception of the merits and perils of competition; the 
transformations in economic thinking about these issues; and the 
attempts to create an eBook market. Collectively, those often-parallel 
stories lead the readers to the Apple conspiracy. This essay cannot do 
justice to the in-depth, complex, and captivating narrative strands that 
Sagers weaves together to take us there. Indeed, by the time the 
readers get to the conspiracy itself, Sagers’s rich analysis makes it look 
like an almost unavoidable result of the longstanding tensions in the 
relevant industries and in the law.   
But Sagers’s story is not only, or even mainly, just a story of the 
Apple conspiracy, the eBooks industry, or books in general. Sagers’s 
main purpose is probably to examine antitrust law and competition 
policy and to use the Apple conspiracy case to make broader points. 
Indeed, Sagers’s descriptions show that what we now perceive as 
antitrust violations, and what we do not, are rooted in choices the law 
made and preferences it respects. Indeed, the lines between what is 
permitted and what is not are the subject of political, economic, and 
legal fights that have been going on for decades. Sagers’s analysis then 
goes a step further: It is not only antitrust law that we are fighting 
about, but the core values that the antitrust system tries to preserve—
first and foremost competition—are not in themselves self-evident. 
The Apple conspiracy litigation and the discourse it entails, Sagers 
claims, were, in some sense, a trial on the value of competition.  
I already conceded that I would not be able to fully address all the 
questions and nuances in Sagers’s rich account. Instead, in this short 
essay, I want to make several comments about the Apple conspiracy 
 
 
 
 
1 Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 2 (2006). 
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and especially about its aftermath. Focusing on the aftermath means 
focusing on the main player that was left on the field when the dust 
settled: Amazon.  
Part I discusses Amazon’s position in the market and how it 
affected the reaction to the Apple conspiracy. Amazon’s dominance in 
the market not only motivated those who criticized the DOJ’s case 
against Apple, but, I argue, should trouble everyone. Shielding 
Amazon’s market dominance from legal scrutiny is problematic. Part 
II explains that as Amazon takes a more dominant role in this market 
it pushes the publishers out of it. The demise of the major publishers 
by itself is not necessarily bad. They might just provide a set of 
services that were much more valuable in the past than they are today. 
I place the conflict between Amazon and the major publishers in 
context, as one between vested short-term interests and socially 
desirable long-term reforms, and argue that public choice theory 
expects overreliance on short-term vested interests. In addition, 
Amazon’s tech savviness plays into a common, related, and mostly 
misguided narrative, as to the risk that technology poses to 
Americans. That partly explains why the decision to sue Apple and the 
publishers was so controversial.2 What might be unique in the Apple 
story is the defeat of the short-term interests. In other fields, this 
result, unfortunately, is much less attainable.  
Finally, Part III focuses on the relationship between Amazon’s 
market power and the authors of the books it is selling by making a 
rather radical claim: as Amazon gains more and more power in this 
market it does not just deflate the publishers’ and the authors’ 
compensation, but it also puts itself in a position of determining the 
overall reward for their creativity, while balancing various conflicting 
interests. As such, Amazon’s policies are replacing much of copyright 
law itself as the source of creativity’s incentives structure. This raises 
complex issues that this essay only briefly touches upon. For now, it is 
enough to say that while those changes might be desirable in the short 
run, their long term effects remain to be seen. 
 
 
 
 
2 In other words, in Part I, I will argue that the DOJ might be criticized because of the long-
term dominance of Amazon. But, Part II shows that part of the motivation of those who 
criticized the DOJ had little to do with those legitimate long-term concerns.  
370 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 14:2 
 
 
PART I. AMAZON THE MONOPOLY: DOES AMAZON DEMOLISH EXISTING 
MARKETS? 
Apple, Antitrust, and Irony focuses on the book industry, the 
major book publishers, and, maybe to a lesser degree, Apple. 
However, the public reaction to the Apple conspiracy might have been 
primarily motivated by the identity of the victim of the Apple 
conspiracy: Amazon. Amazon was probably the main target and the 
driving force of those who criticized the DOJ for suing Apple and the 
major publishers.3 Amazon, both then and now, is perceived as a 
monopoly.4 For that reason, I believe that, to a large degree, the 
reaction to the Apple conspiracy was not an attack on competition 
itself (although in the next Part I will partly relax that statement), but 
an attack on monopolies and the risk they pose to competition.  
Charles Schumer, the Senate minority leader, criticized the DOJ 
lawsuit by stressing Amazon’s monopoly power: “The suit will restore 
Amazon to the dominant position atop the e-books market it occupied 
for years before competition arrived in the form of Apple. If that 
happens, consumers will be forced to accept whatever prices Amazon 
sets.”5 Eleven months later, during the trial, L. Gordon Crovitz of the 
Wall Street Journal wrote: “This case against Apple has been a strange 
one from the start. Amazon had 90% of the e-book market until Apple 
launched the iPad. Amazon is now down to 60% market share. Isn't 
antitrust law supposed to encourage competition?”6 A month later, 
 
 
 
 
3 When I refer to those DOJ critics I’m addressing a heterogeneous group of commentators. 
Most of those commentators perceived Amazon as the villain in the story and Apple and 
the publishers as the heroes. Many of those have criticized the Department of Justice for 
suing Apple and/or for not suing Amazon, although some of them might have expressed 
similar concerns about Amazon without directly criticizing the DOJ.   
4 Antitrust law defines what companies enjoy monopoly power. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN 
ACT 20 (2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2009/05/11/236681.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CRD5-KBZE]. Most would agree that Amazon meets this definition in 
the eBooks market, as the parties in the Apple litigation did. See United States v. Apple, 
Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). For my purposes it is not crucial whether 
or not Amazon meets all those requirements, but it is significant that it has enough market 
power to set prices with relatively little market pressure.      
5 Charles E. Schumer, Memo to DOJ: Drop the Apple E-Books Suit, WALL ST. J., July 18, 
2012, at A15.  
6 L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Age: Apple’s 30% E-Book Commission Is 100% Legal, 
WALL ST. J., June 10, 2013, at A11. 
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when the district court ruled for the government, a New York Times 
editorial also criticized the lawsuit: “The big picture is that while 
Apple's pact with the publishers raised prices in the short term, it also 
brought much-needed competition to the e-book marketplace … That 
is healthier for the publishers and for consumers, too.”7  
Sagers is, of course, aware of those claims. In fact, he cites those 
sources. Later, in chapter 13, he addresses the argument in depth by 
explaining that Amazon’s actions probably did not violate antitrust 
law and therefore the government could not have successfully sued 
Amazon. From a narrow perspective, this analysis makes perfect 
sense. The toolbox that current antitrust plaintiffs have at their 
disposal to curtail existing monopoly power is quite limited. The law 
does not prohibit the creation of monopolies, their existence,8 or most 
of their pricing decisions. Illegal monopolization is limited to just 
certain actions,9 with the case law focusing on refusal to deal, which is 
irrelevant in Amazon’s case.10 The only potentially illegal activity 
Amazon was engaged in was predatory pricing. However, Sagers 
explains, the case law sets a high threshold for proving this 
violation11—and for good reasons.12 That threshold could rarely be met 
nowadays, and it was unattainable in the eBooks case.  
While this explanation properly addresses the current state of the 
law and clarifies why the DOJ did not sue Amazon, it likely does not 
fully tackle the concerns that the DOJ’s critics raised. The implicit 
issues that many of them had were not limited just to the application 
of current law but to what the law should and should not do: should 
the law allow a giant such as Amazon to have such a dramatically 
significant market share? The answer is not obviously negative, not in 
general and not in the context of Amazon.  
 
 
 
 
7 Editorial, The E-Book Price-Fixing Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2013, at A18. 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
9 Id. (noting that the illegality is “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen, or historic accident.”).   
10 CHRIS SAGERS, APPLE, ANTITRUST, AND IRONY (forthcoming 2018).  
11 Id. See also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-
24 (1993) (setting forth the requirements for showing predatory pricing).  
12 SAGERS, supra note 10 (explaining the difficulty in identifying predatory pricing and the 
concern that it would chill socially desirable competitive pricing).  
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Our legal system chose to have limited restrictions on monopoly 
power. We could have had broader restrictions. For example, as 
Sagers mentioned, Congress considered but did not pass various 
legislative initiatives that tried to address market concentration 
concerns more aggressively, such as a “no-fault monopolization” 
statute.13 In some specific industries, public utilities and other natural 
monopolies being the most obvious examples, various laws regulate 
the activities of monopolists, including their pricing decisions.14 The 
fact that Amazon is not subject to such laws (as well as many other 
companies, such as Walmart or Google in their respective markets) is 
the result of collective decisions. This is not the place to argue whether 
this is the right choice, which is a complex question.15 But the sense 
that concentrated market power is a cause of concern that the law 
should deal with is a reasonable one.  
Zooming in on Amazon: even if the DOJ were unlikely to prove a 
predatory pricing claim against Amazon under existing law, should 
Amazon and its pricing decisions be a cause for concern? Sagers 
provides some counter-arguments:16 Amazon’s prices for eBooks were 
not predatory, in the sense that they were roughly equal to its 
marginal costs and not below them. Moreover, Amazon did not raise 
prices even as its market share expanded and even when the 
conspiracy against it collapsed. Nor did Amazon try to use its market 
dominance to take other socially harmful actions, such as viewpoint 
censorship.  
Those are all valid arguments, but I’m not convinced that they 
make Amazon’s market power untroubling. Amazon is playing a long-
term game and therefore judging its actions in the short run might not 
tell the full story. Take, for example, Amazon’s retail pricing decision. 
It is unclear why they are so low. Unlike Schumer, the publishers, and 
many authors, my concern with those low prices has little to do with 
the harm they cause to the existing publishing industry, which is the 
 
 
 
 
13 SAGERS, supra note 10; William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and 
Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 
1126-27 (1989). But see Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of 
Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 632 (2012).  
14 Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 
CAL. L. REV. 479, 484 (1998). 
15 Compare, for example, Kovacic, supra note 13, with Orbach & Rebling, supra note 13.  
16 SAGERS, supra note 10.  
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focus of the discussion in Part II below. Instead, the issue is that those 
low prices need to be explained. Amazon has enough market power to 
raise retail prices well beyond its marginal costs, but it refrains from 
doing so. As I, like most (including Sagers, if I had to guess), believe 
that benevolent monopolies are very rare, if they exist at all, I wonder 
what is Amazon’s long-term plan. For example, do those low prices 
cross-subsidize other Amazon products?17 Or maybe a price increase is 
on the horizon once Amazon’s market share increases even more?18 
Without that information, it is hard to know how much of a threat 
Amazon might become.19  
Moreover, in other contexts, Amazon might have engaged in a 
predatory pricing scheme—one that sets prices very low to drive 
competitors out of the market only to gain market power and raise 
prices. For example, it was reported that Amazon might have lost up 
to $100 million in an aggressive predatory pricing scheme fight with a 
much smaller company, Quidsi, which then operated Diapers.com.20 
 
 
 
 
17 The various Kindle readers do not seem like reasonable candidates for cross-subsidy 
because Kindle eBooks can be viewed on practically all platforms.  
18 Cf. United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“DOJ 
describes as ‘speculative’ the fear that Amazon might use its monopoly power to raise 
prices in the future.”).  
19 Monopoly power is of course much less troubling without barriers to entry. See, e.g., 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 591 n.15 (1986) 
(“[W]ithout barriers to entry it would presumably be impossible to maintain 
supracompetitive prices for an extended time.”). However, it seems that some barriers exist 
in this market, which would allow Amazon to maintain its market position in the long run 
and raise prices. Those barriers include the licensing schemes that Amazon set up with so 
many publishers, the technology that goes into the creation and distribution of books and 
eBooks, Amazon’s brand name, Amazon’s economy of scale, especially when it comes to 
physical products (i.e., books), Amazon’s rating system, and more. Granted, none of those 
factors, individually, seems to pose a truly significant barrier to entry, but together they 
probably do. This partly explains why, despite the publishers’ efforts to introduce another 
eBook distributor, which included creating their own eBook store, see SAGERS, supra note 
10, Amazon controls more than 80% of the eBook market. See Big, Bad, Wide & 
International Report, AUTHOR EARNINGS (Feb. 2017), 
http://authorearnings.com/report/february-2017 [https://perma.cc/7L7B-H9G6].  
20 Lina M. Khan, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 768-70 (2017); Will 
Oremus, The Time Jeff Bezos Went Thermonuclear on Diapers.com, SLATE (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/10/10/amazon_book_how_jeff_bezos_w
ent_thermonuclear_on_diapers_com.html [https://perma.cc/DN4A-E852]; Nick Saint, 
Amazon Nukes Diapers.com In Price War, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 5, 2010, 9:31AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-diapers-price-war-2010-11 
[http://perma.cc/4CED-RVPK]. 
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The pricing scheme and the threat to lower prices even further 
eventually forced Quidsi’s executives to agree to sell their company to 
Amazon. Amazon then raised prices.21 Amazon used a similar strategy 
to purchase other small companies.22 The major publishers are 
probably stronger than Quidsi and the other victims of this strategy—
the 2014 dispute between Amazon and Hachette, which ended in a 
compromise that allowed Hachette to set its own prices seems to show 
it23—but, especially in the long-run, they are not immune from it.  
The argument is rather intuitive: market concentration is 
worrisome in itself, and in the era of mass concentration in so many 
markets, typically (unlike the Amazon case) driven by large-scale 
mergers, the public pays attention to them.24 Most of those concerns 
are in the long-term.25 In the short run, Amazon seems like a 
wonderful company that gained most of its reputation by being 
innovative, sophisticated, and responsive to market demand. Its 
market power is an award for its brilliance. But in the long-run, it can 
be dangerous.   
 
 
 
 
21 Khan, supra note 20, at 770.  
22 Carl T. Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom: The Curse of Bigness and the Failure of 
Antitrust, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 25 (2015).  
23 During 2014, Amazon and Hachette, one of the six major publishers at the time, were 
engaged in a public dispute, focusing on the same issue that the Apple conspiracy revolved 
around: who gets to set the retail prices of eBooks. During that dispute, Amazon used 
various tactics to discourage sales of Hachette books, which shows how powerful the 
company is. On the other hand, when the dispute settled, in November 2014, Hachette 
won, at least in the short-run, as Amazon allowed it to set the retail prices of its eBooks. 
Many commentators, however, believe that this settlement will not prevent future disputes 
and that Amazon will likely be even more powerful when they arise. David Streitfeld, 
Amazon and Hachette Resolve Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/technology/amazon-hachette-ebook-dispute.html.  
24 See, e.g., John Oliver, Corporate Consolidation: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, 
YOUTUBE (Sep. 24, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=00wQYmvfhn4 
[http://perma.cc/2R6M-M3PC].  
25 It is hard to rule out that there is a short-term harm as well. Some of the harm that 
monopolies inflict is not easily known or noticeable in real time. For example, monopolies 
might suppress innovations, as AT&T Bell Laboratories did, in a way that was difficult to 
observe. Bill Frezza, Ma Bell Suppressed Innovation for Thirty Grueling Years, FOUND. 
ECON. EDUC. (July 21, 2016), https://fee.org/articles/ma-bell-suppressed-innovation-for-
thirty-grueling-years [https://perma.cc/6JR4-Q2TQ]. Intuitively, I doubt that Amazon is 
already engaged in such a scheme although one must admit that it probably can easily do it 
without the public’s knowledge.  
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This probably explains why Amazon is both popular among 
consumers26 but at the same time feared and vilified.27  
Sagers raised another important point: even if Amazon’s market 
power is concerning, should that allow the publishers to engage in 
horizontal price fixing? Cartels of that kind are illegal and they inflict 
harm on consumers, and so why shouldn’t the DOJ sue them? That is 
a valid and difficult question.  
There is, however, a counter-argument: Even if we take the 
current state of antitrust law as a given, the DOJ can still exercise 
prosecutorial discretion and avoid suing Apple and the publishers. 
The DOJ, one can argue, must consider the decrease in Amazon’s 
market power that the cartel caused28 and compare that problematic 
situation to the one in which Amazon controls the market. It’s a choice 
between two bad options: a long-term oligopoly held together by a 
horizontal price fixing cartel or a monopoly. In making that choice, 
the DOJ should probably place relatively little weight on the current 
pricing decisions of Amazon, because, once the benevolent monopolist 
hypothesis is rejected, it should consider the possibility of different 
prices in the future.  
This counter-argument has its weaknesses and I’m not sure I’m 
convinced by it. Indeed, it is hard to allow the real immediate harm to 
consumers to continue uninterrupted just to preserve speculative 
long-term benefits. In addition, it is unclear that the DOJ should even 
use prosecutorial discretion—a controversial topic in other contexts 
that is well beyond the scope of this essay29—so broadly to allow a 
 
 
 
 
26 See, e.g., Nick Statt, Amazon Is the Ruthless Corporate Juggernaut People Love, THE 
VERGE (Oct. 27, 2017, 8:47AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/27/16552614/amazon-popularity-user-survey-prime-
echo-trust [https://perma.cc/T39V-RM5J].  
27 See, e.g., Matt Weinberger, Amazon keeps reminding us that it’s the most dangerous 
company in tech, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 25, 2017, 8:30AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-versus-everybody-2017-2 
[http://perma.cc/76ZH-D63W]; Matt Stoller, America’s Amazon Problem, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 16, 2017, 6:19PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/americas-amazon-
problem_us_59443b5be4b06bb7d2731cba [https://perma.cc/P4BU-TU4H]. 
28 United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[I]t is 
undisputed that Amazon’s market share in e-books decreased from 90 to 60 percent in the 
two years following the introduction of agency pricing.”).  
29 Prosecutorial discretion is a hotly debated topic in areas such as criminal procedures and 
immigration. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 167 (5th Cir. 2015); The Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec.’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the 
U.S. and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2014), 
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clear violation of federal law to proceed.30 Nevertheless, the intuition 
of the DOJ critics is clear. Indeed, there is some irony and unease 
when an antitrust case cements a company’s extreme monopoly 
power.     
PART II. AMAZON THE PUBLISHER: DOES AMAZON DEMOLISH THE 
PUBLISHING BUSINESS? 
Sagers suggests that the debate about the Apple conspiracy is, at 
least to a degree, a debate about the value of competition. I mostly 
agree. I think it is, to a degree, a debate about the dynamic value of 
competition, and as such, it is a well-known phenomenon that I would 
like to place in context.  
Standard economic theory explains that competition has both 
static and dynamic benefits. From a static perspective, the competitive 
pressure reduces prices and thus increases quantities, and with it the 
total social surplus. I think it is more difficult to convince large 
segments of the public that this effect of competition is undesirable, 
although, as we shall see in Part III below, some authors have made 
that claim.  
The dynamic effects of competition are both distinguishable and 
more controversial. In the long run, by driving prices close to their 
marginal costs competition causes inefficient businesses to lose 
money and to eventually disappear. Economists consider this change 
efficient as it allows cheaper production and distribution, encourages 
creativity, and increases overall total surplus in the long run.  
But for many, the long-run is heavily discounted. As John Keynes 
famously said (in a different context): “In the long run, we are all 
dead.”31 In the short run, this switch from an existing market structure 
to a new one is not instantaneous and it causes tremendous agony 
                                                                                                               
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-
11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVJ3-V5SL]; Daniel J. Freed, 
Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of 
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1754 (1992).  
30 It is also unclear that the DOJ even had the power to let Apple and the publishers get 
away with their conspiracy. States were also suing Apple and the publishers and private 
entities, including Amazon, could also step in if the DOJ refused to act.  
31 Simon Taylor, The True Meaning of “In the long run we are all dead”, SIMON TAYLOR’S 
BLOG (May 5, 2013) https://www.simontaylorsblog.com/2013/05/05/the-true-meaning-
of-in-the-long-run-we-are-all-dead [https://perma.cc/4Q5H-XG5C]. 
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during the transition. This pain is typically concentrated in a small 
and identified group, while the benefits are typically diffused over a 
larger group that, in many cases, includes unidentified and even 
unknown individuals. Standard public choice theory suggests that a 
small, wealthy, homogenous, and well-identified group will typically 
be able to exercise more political pressure than a group, even larger, 
that is more heterogenic and not well defined.32 Thus, the long-term 
changes that competition brings can often produce significant political 
pushback from entrenched interest groups.  
The book industry nicely demonstrates this broader point.33 In the 
last decades, the land is shaking under the book publishers’ feet, a 
phenomenon that Sagers explores throughout his book. I believe that 
at its core the publisher problem is existential: many of the services 
they provide are becoming less and less valuable in the 21st century. In 
the past, the publishers served as important gatekeepers, especially 
with respect to bottlenecks in the distribution chains.34 When books 
 
 
 
 
32 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: 
Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 738–39 (1991) 
(“interest groups are much more likely to organize and be politically salient if they are 
small, wealthy, and homogeneous”), and the reference there.  
33 In fact, even when it comes to the book industry, these arguments are not new. Jewish 
law, for example, has been struggling with similar questions for about 500 years. For 
example, in 1550, Rabbi Moses Isserles addressed a dispute between two Italian 
publishers: The first, Giustiniani, was the leading publisher of Jewish books at the time 
with significant market power. The second, Bragadini, wanted to enter the market by 
republishing a classic Jewish book, Mishneh Torah, with modern editing and commentary. 
Giustiniani threatened to undercut whatever price Bragadini set and thus deny it entry into 
the market. Bragadini’s Jewish editor, Meir Katzenellenbogen, then approached Isserles 
and asked him to grant Bragadini ten-year exclusivity over the publishing of Mishneh 
Torah, which would mean boycotting Giustiniani’s version. In a decision that became one 
of the cornerstones of Jewish copyright law, Isserles granted this request. His detailed 
reasoning surprisingly tracked many arguments that are relevant nowadays to Amazon and 
its dispute with the major publishers, including the need to allow entry to a concentrated 
market, even if that entry is fostered by short-term price increase, the best way to 
incentivize publication, the need to limit predatory pricing, and a concern over censorship. 
See NEIL NETANEL, FROM MAIMONIDES TO MICROSOFT: THE JEWISH LAW OF COPYRIGHT 
SINCE THE BIRTH OF PRINT 71-114 (2016).  
34 See RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE 
(2000); Joel Waldfogel & Imke Reimers, Storming the Gatekeepers: Digital 
Disintermediation in the Market for Books, 31 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 47, 48-49 (2015); Sam 
Henrie, A New Era in Book Publishing, WHEATMARK (Feb. 14, 2008), 
https://www.wheatmark.com/a-new-era-in-book-publishing/ [https://perma.cc/FM8R-
8B4S]; Alex Pham, Book publishers see their role as gatekeepers shrink, BALT. SUN (Dec. 
26, 2010), http://www.baltimoresun.com/la-fi-gatekeepers-20101226-story.html 
[http://perma.cc/MKS7-R8TE]. 
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were primarily sold in stores, where space was limited both in the 
front (i.e., display area) and in the back (i.e., storage), ex-ante 
identification of worthy titles was crucial, and the publishers provided 
such filtering services. They initially did it in their own stores35 but, 
later, they did it for and together with stores owned by others.36 The 
process did not just require the publishers to identify the worthy titles 
but also to establish and manage the relationship with those 
companies that controlled the distribution channels.  
As the value of the display space diminished the value of the 
publishers as gatekeepers diminished as well. In an era of large online 
stores, the amount of space is exploding, which makes the value of 
that space smaller. In its prime, a large Borders store could have 
stored up to 140,000 different book titles, which is a small fraction of 
the number of books available.37 Amazon, for comparison, has over 3.7 
million available eBooks on sale at any given time.38 Print on demand, 
an idea that Amazon has been toying with for a few years, might 
eliminate any remaining value of storage space. EBooks similarly 
eliminate the value of physical storage space altogether.  
As Sagers explains, the value of the publishers as gatekeepers is 
further diminished as online platforms develop their own systems of 
ratings, which seem to match the consumer preferences at least as 
well as the publishers do.39 Publishers also serve important financial 
needs of the author by paying them advances, which both reduce their 
risk and provide them with quicker compensation. The value of those 
services, while still valid, is also reduced with the significant reduction 
in the fixed costs of producing a digital book.40 The value of the 
 
 
 
 
35 SAGERS, supra note 10. 
36 More specifically, publishers typically paid bookstores for the right to prominently 
display their titles in the limited display space. Randy Kennedy, Cash Up Front, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 5, 2005) http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/05/books/review/cash-up-front.html. 
This practice still exists in the digital age as Amazon also charges publishers for promoting 
their books.  
37 Waldfogel & Reimers, supra note 34, at 49.  
38 Piotr Kowalczyk, Kindle Unlimited ebook subscription – 12 things to know, EBOOK 
FRIENDLY (Dec. 18, 2017), https://ebookfriendly.com/kindle-unlimited-ebook-
subscription/ [https://perma.cc/HJ6V-DHR7]. 
39 SAGERS, supra note 10; Waldfogel & Reimers, supra note 34, at 49-50. 
40 Waldfogel & Reimers, supra note 34, at 49.  
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remaining services that the publishers provide, such as editing or 
paging, is probably smaller. And modern technology is expected to 
diminish the value of those remaining services as well.41 It is therefore 
not surprising that a self-publishing model, which bypasses the 
publishers altogether, has been developed and has become more and 
more popular in the last few years.42  
From this perspective, the tension between the publishers and 
Amazon is almost unavoidable and it does not necessarily depend on 
Amazon’s market power. Even if instead of one gigantic Amazon the 
market had several smaller technologically-sophisticated companies, 
the publishers would disapprove of the changes that those companies 
would have brought with them. In many respects, a publisher and an 
Amazon-like distributor are two types of intermediaries in a market 
that might need only one.43  
When presented in this way, the publishers’ position is all too 
familiar. It is not that different from that of lamplighters, taxicab 
drivers, telephone operators, and in the creative industries, 
photographers, newspaper distributors, or video rental store owners. 
It is understandable why the public is conflicted about those changes. 
The harm to those losing their jobs—from gas station attendants, to 
travel agents, to coal miners—is very real and very salient. The 
 
 
 
 
41 See, e.g., Darren Allan, IBM's Watson tries its hand at editing a magazine, TECHRADAR 
(June 21, 2016), http://www.techradar.com/news/world-of-tech/ibm-s-watson-tries-its-
hand-at-editing-a-magazine-1323716 [http://perma.cc/HJ9E-G7B3] (discussing a 
magazine that was edited by IBM's Watson); Is The Period Dead? One BuzzFeed Editor On 
How The Internet Has Changed Language, WBUR (Nov. 29, 2017, 2:22PM), 
http://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2017/11/29/emmy-favilla-world-without-whom 
[https://perma.cc/ZQ7H-LTU2] (suggesting that the value of grammar rules is 
diminishing nowadays); Adrian Shaughnessy, Will designers be replaced by robots?, 
CREATIVEBLOQ (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.creativebloq.com/features/will-designers-be-
replaced-by-robots [http://perma.cc/A59Y-M8AU] (discussing whether technology might 
replace graphic designers). A full analysis of the possibilities and limitations of technology 
in performing those tasks is well beyond the scope of this essay.  
42 Waldfogel & Reimers, supra note 34, at 55.  
43 The process in which a new model replaces an old established one typically takes time 
and copyright law allows the publishers to slow it down even further. Publishers can rely 
both on their older copyrighted works and on authors they built relationships with in the 
old world to keep a dominant position even if a newer model is superior. For several 
reasons the publishers’ ability to slow down this trend is probably more limited with 
respect to eBooks: The publishers bring limited experience to this market and even more 
limited technology; it’s a market that requires less gatekeeping; and, last but not least, 
many publishers did not secure their rights to the eBook format of older works. See 
Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books, LLC, 283 F.3d 490, 491-92 (2d Cir. 2002).  
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benefits from these processes, while real, are not as observable. When 
it comes to the publishing industry, the harm is especially salient 
because some of the beneficiaries of the current order are well-known. 
Indeed, as will further be explored below, many famous authors 
participated in this public discourse and commented on the harm that 
the new order is causing them.44 When it comes to the book industry, 
the beneficiaries of this process include many less successful authors, 
who are now allowed access to a broader market that the digital 
revolution opens up as well as consumers who are charged lower 
prices.45  
This tension between short-term identified harm and long-term 
and possibly diffused benefits is not limited to competition policy. It is 
not unusual for the public to give too little weight to long-term 
considerations and to intuitively oppose changes that would yield 
results mainly down the line.46 Examples abound: one of the main 
tensions within copyright policy is between current and future 
authors. Expanding copyright protection serves the interest of current 
authors, as it provides them with more control and higher revenues 
from their works. Limiting copyright, on the other hand, serves the 
interests of future creators as it bolsters the public domain and 
provides the authors of tomorrow with a more robust library of old 
works to rely upon.  
Historically, the story of copyright law is one of expanding rights, 
from 14-28 years during the 18th century to about 100 years today. 
From a right that was limited to books, charts, and maps then, to close 
to any fixed creative work now. From a right that was focused on 
restrictions on reproduction and distribution, to one that now 
encompasses public performance and adaptation rights. Most of these 
expansions were the result of legislative amendments to the Copyright 
Act, for which vested stakeholders—authors guilds, publishers, 
libraries, and production companies, to name just a few—heavily 
 
 
 
 
44 David Streitfeld, Plot Thickens as 900 Writers Battle Amazon, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/business/media/plot-thickens-as-900-
writers-battle-amazon.html [http://perma.cc/3KUJ-8CA5]. 
45 Waldfogel & Reimers documented a significant reduction in sales concentration in the 
book industry since 2010, as well as significant increase in the popularity of eBooks and a 
decrease in their prices. Waldfogel & Reimers, supra note 34, at 52-55. 
46 This phenomenon is well documented in various areas of social science, including, for 
example, the calculation of present value of future income in economics and the status quo 
bias in psychology.  
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lobbied.47 Here too, as was the case during the disputes between 
Amazon and the major publishers, famous, popular, and well-
established authors—such as Mark Twain, Sonny Bono, and Bob 
Dylan48—actively participated in and lobbied for copyright expansion. 
Future creators, and especially future industries, were, for the most 
part, not represented in those discussions.49 
This public choice problem can lead to much worse results: 
Consider, for example, global warming. From an abstract perspective, 
the debate about global warming follows the same pattern. In the long 
run, it is clear to most that humanity is likely heading to an 
unprecedented catastrophe. But addressing it will be agonizing and 
costly in the short run. Moreover, many of the measurements 
designed to combat climate change and reduce CO2 emission target 
specific identified industries, such as those that rely on coal and other 
dirty energy (from coal miners to utility companies). Those industries, 
and the people whose livelihood depends on them, are naturally 
fighting back.50 And so far, for the most part, they are winning and 
humanity does not seem to be willing to bear the short-term costs of 
addressing the forthcoming long-term calamity.   
 
 
 
 
47 Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 857, 862 (1987) (defining the process leading to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 
1976 as an “anomalous legislative process designed to force special interest groups to 
negotiate with one another.”). 
48 Mark Twain testified before Congress, asking to extend the term of copyright, possibly in 
perpetuity, as well as to grant additional set of rights. See Samuel L. Clemens, Copyright in 
Perpetuity, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 109, 110 (2002); see also Guy A. Rub, Stronger Than 
Kryptonite? Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
49, 80 (2013). Many famous artists were involved in convincing Congress to extend the 
term of copyright in the 1990s. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 n.15, 223 (2003) 
(referring to the statement of Bob Dylan, as well as Quincy Jones, Don Henley, and Carlos 
Santana urging Congress to pass the Copyright Term Extension Act. The Act was named 
after Sonny Bono, who was one of its main co-sponsors).  
49 See JESSICA D. LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 47 (2001) (“[T]he interests that had not yet 
come into being when the negotiations took place were the quintessential excluded parties. 
They posed a potential competitive threat to all current stakeholders yet they couldn't 
lobby against legislation … they were the parties most likely to find that the negotiated 
compromises operated to their disadvantage.”). Another group that was, at least until 
recently, not properly represented in copyright revision discussions included users and 
consumers of creative work. Id. at 51-52. A full analysis of users’ rights and their 
involvement in the legislative process is beyond the scope of this essay.  
50 See Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 
65 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1684-85 (2012), and the references there.  
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Zooming out even further, this issue is only one aspect of the gap 
between the way experts, and in particular economists, and laypeople 
perceive policy questions. As part of that gap, laypersons are much 
more pessimistic about the future and are significantly more 
concerned about the effect of technology. One comprehensive 1996 
survey found that 46% of laymen but only 2% of economists believe 
that one of the major reasons that the economy was not doing better 
was that “technology is displacing workers.” 74% of economists, but 
only 15% of the general public, saw it as a non-issue.51 The economist 
Bryan Caplan analyzed the survey by pointing to the “sense [among 
economists] that the popularity of mistaken economic beliefs leads 
democracies to adopt foolish economic policies” and that “there is a 
long tradition in economics of (a) recognizing systematic belief 
differences between economists and the public, and (b) blaming policy 
failures on these belief differences.”52 
Framing the dispute between the publishers and Amazon as an 
example of a broader tension between new and old industries shows 
that the difficulties that Sagers identifies and thoroughly analyzes 
might not be solvable. The issues are real. In the dispute between the 
publishers and Amazon, the economic view might have won, but, as 
we saw, in other contexts public misconception can lead to 
undesirable public policies. Sagers’s book does not offer real solutions 
to this issue and it is quite likely that there are no easy fixes.53 But the 
first stage in addressing the issue is identifying and analyzing it and 
 
 
 
 
51 Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 12 
(1996), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/1996/09/survey-of-
americans-and-economists-on-the-economy-toplines-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/93XY-
DGTU].  
52 BRYAN CAPLAN, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 180-81 (Charles Rowley & 
Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004). 
53 Solutions, mostly partial, to the issue are beyond the scope of this essay. In some cases, 
public education might mitigate the issue. In some countries the legislators addressed this 
short-sight bias by creating special commissions or committees that are designed to put a 
thumb on the scale in public discussions in favor of future interests of unidentified 
stakeholders. See Tomilola Akanle, Proposal for Ombudsperson for Future Generations 
Published, SDG KNOWLEDGE HUB (Feb. 23, 2012), http://sdg.iisd.org/news/proposal-for-
ombudsperson-for-future-generations-published/ [https://perma.cc/K7HS-ND59]; Sci. & 
Envtl. Health Network & The Int'l Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law Sch. Models for 
Protecting the Environment for Future Generations (2008), 
http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Models_Future_Generations.pdf [https://perma.cc/T93T-
GAWV]. 
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Sagers provides an excellent account and a case study of this tension 
in the eBooks publishing industry.  
PART III. AMAZON AND AUTHORS: DOES AMAZON DEMOLISH 
COPYRIGHT LAW? 
One narrative that runs through the discussion regarding the 
conflict between Amazon and the major publishers is that books are 
special and that they should not be analyzed with the same tools that 
are typically used to analyze market behavior. Sagers, for the most 
part, rejects that argument. Books might have cultural value, but that 
value is an externality and economists can typically consider 
externalities in their analysis. I don’t dispute that argument although I 
will note that analyzing literature’s contribution to humanity in terms 
of externalities entails a possibly normative choice in itself.54  
But books are somewhat unique even if one uses market rhetoric. 
As Sagers recognizes, the initial fixed costs of creating books, 
especially the author’s alternative costs, are typically significant, while 
marginal costs are low, especially for eBooks. Consequently, the 
average costs of books typically exceed their marginal costs and 
therefore, unlike many other goods, competition can be destructive for 
them.55 The standard response, which Sagers also provides, is 
copyright law. It is true that copyright law is designed and justified by 
the need to solve this market failure. But in at least some respects that 
answer kicks the can down the road. The effectiveness of many 
 
 
 
 
54 One may argue that the question is not whether economists have a way to model cultural 
contribution and personal expression but should they. In applying market rhetoric to those 
values, the argument goes, we change and diminish the value itself. Indeed, it is quite 
possible that some of the “books are unique” claimants perceive them as an extension of 
their personhood and are thus channeling arguments that are part of the non-
commodification rhetoric. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1850 (1987). Sagers does not address such an argument in his book 
and I also am going to leave it beyond the scope of this essay.  
55 Cf., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 282-83 (1970) (suggesting 
that many authors can recoup their fixed costs even in a competitive market). 
Notwithstanding the validity of Breyer’s arguments when his work was authored, with 
copying costs being close to zero nowadays it is hard to imagine the book industry 
surviving without some legal protection from free copying. A full analysis of the role that 
copyright law plays and does not play in encouraging creativity is of course well beyond the 
scope of this essay.  
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copyright law doctrines partly depends on the structure of the market 
for copyrighted goods.56  
Copyright provides incentives to authors by partly shielding their 
works from competitive pressure. But, as the conflict between the 
major publishers and Amazon nicely demonstrates, the size of the 
incentives package that authors receive fundamentally depends on the 
market in which they operate. Amazon, quite consistently, both before 
and after the Apple conspiracy, pressured publishers to reduce 
prices.57 Amazon’s dominant position in the market, discussed above, 
allows it to effectively exercise that pressure notwithstanding the 
market power that copyright law attempts to give to authors and their 
assignees and licensees—the publishers.  
In the post-Apple-conspiracy world, with Amazon’s market share 
growing even more, Amazon can continue to push book prices toward 
their marginal costs, or, at least if Amazon cares about the long-term 
stability of the market (more on that below), toward their average 
costs. That pressure will not stop at the publishers. It is unavoidable 
that the authors will feel it as well. Lowering the wholesale prices that 
Amazon pays (whether or not Amazon keeps retail prices low), means 
that the publishers will pay authors less. If Amazon gets a close to 
absolute power to set prices, and with it indirectly the authors’ 
compensation, then copyright law becomes partly irrelevant. 
This last point might need further clarification: copyright law 
assumes that authors will trade in their copyright-law-created market 
power. The broader that market power is, the more authors will be 
able to get in the marketplace for it and the larger their incentives will 
be.58 This simple description suggests that the market in which 
authors operate is crucial for copyright policy. Indeed, copyright law 
assumes that authors will trade in their rights, which means that they 
will have a market in which to do so. When one company controls a 
 
 
 
 
56 In this essay I focus on the overall incentives to create. But even specific copyright law 
doctrines might implicitly assume a certain market structure. See, e.g., Rub, supra note 48, 
at 86-87 (explaining how copyright’s termination of transfer mechanism makes sense in 
certain market structures but not in others).  
57 Sagers explores in depth Amazon’s pricing strategies leading to the Apple conspiracy and 
shortly thereafter. This constant pricing pressure on the publishers did not stop and it led, 
two years later, to the public dispute between Amazon and Hachette. See supra note 23.   
58 Those incentives are the main social benefits of copyright law. Copyright law also entails 
social costs, such as limiting access. See Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 
64 EMORY L.J. 741, 763-65 (2015). A full analysis of those costs and the balance between 
them and the benefits is beyond the scope of this essay. 
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vital point in the distribution chain then that market does not really 
exist. The prices in that market are primarily determined by that 
monopolist. At least in the short run, there is no reason for the 
monopolist to refrain from pushing the prices it pays down toward 
their marginal costs. If prices are determined by those costs, then 
copyright is mostly irrelevant. It no longer plays a vital role in 
determining the authors’ compensation.59  
Is this change socially desirable? A full analysis is quite complex 
and beyond the scope of this essay, but in the next few paragraphs I 
will provide a few initial thoughts.  
This situation is obviously undesirable to most commercial 
authors60 and it is therefore not surprising that in recent years many 
prominent authors attacked Amazon’s market power and policies.61 
Some of those authors were not shy in claiming that they deserve 
higher compensation for their books and that Amazon sells them too 
 
 
 
 
59 If a company is truly a monopolist in a truly permanent vital step in the distribution 
chain, copyright law might be completely irrelevant. But this situation is exceptionally 
unrealistic, and Amazon is nowhere close to that status and will likely never be. Amazon 
might eventually control practically all the market for the sale of eBooks and maybe even 
for the sale of books. But it will still face indirect competitive pressure through related 
markets, such as from public domain works, a market in which Google plays a vital role, as 
it distributes those works for free as part of its Google Books project. Copyright law is of 
course relevant in determining what works are in the public domain and what are not. 
Piracy provides yet another competitive pressure to Amazon. Finally, and importantly, 
book authors do not generate all their income from selling books and eBooks. They also 
earn an income from selling related rights, such as rights to adapt their work in other 
forms, such as movies, and from public speaking engagements. Copyright law plays an 
important role in those endeavors, and as long as the monopolist does not control those 
markets as well, copyright will continue to play a role in incentivizing authors.  
60 Amazon’s market position, and the digital revolution in general, also helps some authors. 
First, as already explored, the sale of books nowadays is less concentrated, which allows 
more authors to be best-selling ones. See Waldfogel & Reimers, supra note 34, at 55. 
Moreover, keeping retail prices low increases the quantities sold, which is especially 
valuable to certain types of authors, such as those who write for non-commercial purposes 
(sometimes called “authors who write to be read”) such as those in academia and some 
starting authors. See Mission Statement, AUTHOR’S ALLIANCE, 
https://www.authorsalliance.org/about/#mission [https://perma.cc/87EH-QLKH]. Some 
authors therefore supported Amazon in its dispute with Hachette. Alan Yuhas, Amazon vs 
Hachette: readers and authors take sides in publishing dispute, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 
2014, 1:10PM), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/aug/12/amazon-hachette-
readers-authors-publishing-dispute [https://perma.cc/HV4P-WFEW]. Things might be 
different if Amazon decides to raise its retail prices while keeping wholesale prices low.  
61 Streitfeld, supra note 44; Stephen Colbert, Amazon v. Hachette, COMEDY CENTRAL (June 
4, 2014), http://www.cc.com/video-clips/ukf9gv/the-colbert-report-amazon-vs--hachette 
[http://perma.cc/Y2HA-67A3].  
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cheaply. But U.S. copyright policy is not designed for the benefit of 
authors, but for that of society.62 Therefore, reducing the authors’ 
compensation, by itself, does not make this situation undesirable.  
The real question, which was already mentioned above, is how the 
monopolist uses its market power. It might be quite socially harmful 
if, for example, it drives wholesale prices to marginal costs and below 
average costs. At that price, many authors63 will be unable to cover 
their fixed costs of writing and will therefore leave the market or 
refuse to enter it. However, the monopolist is likely aware of this 
dynamic impact of its pricing scheme, and therefore, assuming it 
plans to stay in the market for the long run, it will be in the 
monopolist’s best interest to keep wholesale prices at least at average 
costs.64 Authors will then stay in the market. In fact, assuming, again, 
that the monopolist is in it for the long run, it is likely to make pricing 
decisions that balance the interests of current authors with those of 
future authors—a function that copyright law itself is aimed to serve.   
The overall desirability of this scheme will likely depend on the 
retail pricing decision of the monopolist. It is hard to argue that 
Amazon’s current scheme, where it sells eBooks at minimal profits (if 
at all), is socially undesirable, at least in the short run. Authors might 
be paid less, and are being denied some of the benefits copyright law 
tries to give them, but most will agree that those benefits are inflated 
anyway. Copyright is too broad, both in scope and in duration, which 
probably creates over-incentives to create as well as other significant 
social harms. Therefore, reducing the overall compensation to authors 
might not be bad in itself.  
But what makes the current Amazon scheme exceptionally socially 
desirable in the short run is that it transfers much of the fruits of its 
 
 
 
 
62 The Constitution authorizes Congress to enact the Copyright Act “to promote the 
progress of science . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“The monopoly created by copyright thus 
rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public.”); TCA Television Corp. v. 
McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 177 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2175 (2017). 
63 Some authors are naturally less sensitive to changes in the prices of books. Authors 
whose main source of income does not depend on sales, from university professors to 
Hollywood script writers to independently wealthy individuals who write as a hobby, are 
likely to produce books regardless of their royalties. In other words, royalty reduction will 
disproportionately affect certain types of authors and not others.  
64 Average costs will need to take into account all forms of income, including possible 
income from markets that the monopolist does not control, such as the market for movie 
rights. Cf., Breyer, supra note 55, at 310-11; supra note 59.  
2018] RUB 387 
 
 
market power to its consumers. Amazon acts like it is a benevolent 
ruler (or maybe a benevolent bully?) who uses its power to extract 
excessive surplus from the publishers and authors and transfer it to 
consumers. This process entails more than just a transfer of surplus 
because, as prices decrease, the deadweight loss in the market for 
copyrighted goods decreases as well and social surplus increases.  
As long as it lasts. If and when Amazon decides to use its market 
power in other ways, and in particular to increase its retail prices, 
those benefits will be eliminated. Amazon’s market power would then 
just be used to transfer surplus from authors to itself, which does not 
seem to generate any real social benefits even in the short run, and 
will likely be harmful in the long run. 
Amazon’s dominance is problematic from a copyright law 
perspective for other reasons, and in particular its effect on free 
speech. One of the advantages of copyright law, and in fact one of the 
reasons for its creation,65 is that it rewards creativity in a non-
centralized way. Before the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710, 
which is perceived by many as the birth of modern copyright law, the 
law in Great Britain66 required book printers to be licensed by the 
Stationers' Company. That company was a guild of printers that was 
responsible for censoring literary works. Patronage by royalty was also 
a major source of creativity at the time. The public outcry against 
censorship was one of the main causes for the collapse of this system 
and its replacement by modern copyright law.67 The Statute of Anne 
replaced the old system by granting rights to authors who met simple 
statutory requirements without considering the content of their work. 
Modern copyright law cannot fully be understood without 
appreciating its function in promoting free speech. 
When one company controls the book market completely, as 
Amazon might be able to do in the future, the decentralized nature of 
creation that copyright law is trying to foster might be, at least partly, 
lost. If creation is not free, then the advantages of copyright law’s 
 
 
 
 
65 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
354-55 (1996). 
66 The focus here is on the legal development in Britain, as this is the main source of 
American law. While the Statute of Anne was the first modern copyright act in the western 
world, similar statutes were passed in other European countries during the 18th and 19th 
centuries.   
67 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 179 (1968). 
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clumsy post-factum reward mechanism over a system that is based on 
governmental grants and awards becomes questionable.  
Amazon is currently using its censorship power in limited ways. 
For example, it actively removes self-published works that depict 
incest, rape, and child pornography.68 On the other hand, it currently 
does not seem to remove books that criticize Amazon itself.69 But its 
market dominance, especially if it expands further, might allow 
Amazon to do so. Indeed, awarding such a power to one company 
might not be as troubling as awarding it to the government, but it 
should still be quite concerning, as it gives that company significant 
power over public discourse and over the marketplace of ideas.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Chris Sagers’s Apple, Antitrust, and Irony is a wonderful work 
that takes one dispute and through it explores our views of the book 
industry, antitrust policy, competition, technology, and more. The 
book correctly points out and analyzes the dichotomy between the way 
that antitrust law viewed the Apple conspirators’ behavior, as clearly 
illegal, and the public reaction, which, in many cases, perceived them 
more positively.  
In this essay, I address just a few aspects of this complex issue. I 
suggest that the dichotomy is indeed partly driven by suspicion of 
competition as causing a short-term disruption to vested interests—a 
view that is both prevalent and myopic. At the same time, the eBooks 
case is somewhat different, because the collapse of the Apple 
conspiracy left Amazon with tremendous market power. While 
currently Amazon, as far as we know, does not seem to abuse that 
power over the eBooks industry, the concerns about the long-term 
danger of such a market structure are understandable. In the long 
term, that dominance may prompt serious reconsiderations of various 
 
 
 
 
68 Hector Tobar, Self-published Erotica Writers Strike Back, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/17/entertainment/la-et-jc-self-published-erotica-
writers-strike-back-20131017 [https://perma.cc/R7B7-T35R]. As a private company, 
Amazon is of course allowed to choose which books to offer in its stores. To the best of my 
knowledge, most of the titles that Amazon removes do not violate the law and therefore, 
under the First Amendment, the censorship function that Amazon provides could not have 
been performed by a governmental entity.  
69 For example, Amazon currently sells a book entitled MINDLESS: WHY SMARTER 
MACHINES ARE MAKING DUMBER HUMANS, which claims that together with Walmart, 
Amazon might be “the most egregiously ruthless corporation in America.”  
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legal doctrines related to copyright, free speech, and competition 
policy and antitrust law.  
